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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) comes with great
possibilities as well as major security and privacy
issues. Although digital forensics has long been
studied in both academia and industry, mobility
forensics is relatively new and unexplored.
Mobility forensics deals with tools and techniques
that work towards forensically sound recovery of
data and evidence from mobile devices [1]. In this
paper, we explore mobility forensics in the context
of IoT. This paper discusses the data collection and
classification process from IoT smart home devices
in details. It also contains attack scenario based
analysis of collected data and a proposed mobility
forensics model that fits into such scenarios. The
paper concludes with a detail discussion of related
research problems and future work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although mobility forensics for IoT devices is
not a well-defined area of knowledge, this
description summarizes the idea in general:
“Mobility forensics addresses technology’s
movement toward mobile devices (smart phones,
tablets, small computers) and specialized tools
and techniques needed to successfully recover
data and evidence from those devices” [1].

While many IoT sensors are stationary, many
others are mobile. To mention a few, sensors
such as FitBit, sensors within Smartphones, Car
Area Network (CAN) sensors are mobile. The
context of computing is evolving rapidly and
significantly, driven by new mobile and IoT
devices in our homes and industries. Successful
forensics in this kind of device needs new and
updated tools and specialized techniques.
Unfortunately, not much has been done so far in
the field of IoT digital forensics. One reason is
that IoT devices are not widely deployed and
industry is focused on implementing the
technology rather than securing it. But lack of
security in IoT devices may lead to catastrophe
in futuristic scenarios such as the Smart City [2]
and Smart Grid [3]. This paper takes a close look
at security, privacy, and vulnerability issues with
IoT devices from a forensic point of view. As an
example, we have analyzed the data collected by
an IoT smart home device called “Sen.se Mother”
[4], and have developed scenarios showing how
the collected data can help with forensic
investigations. We then propose a model to
determine the implications of collected data and
discuss what it adds to the digital forensics
literature. This is a first such attempt towards
mobility forensics for the Internet of Things.
Although this paper’s findings are based on IoT
devices in smart homes, the results can be
generalized to IoT environments, such as
industrial and other installations.
This paper is structured as follows. We review
the literature in section 2 and discuss a problem
statement in section 3. Section 4 presents our
methodology and procedures and section 5
shows our results. Section 6 covers discussion
and section 7 contains guidance for future work.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Although the field of IoT security research is
relatively new, there has already been much
interesting work. Weber [5] introduced some of

the security, data authentication, access control
and client privacy issues in IoT. Jing et al. [6]
discuss IoT security in general and divide IoT
architecture into layers to ensure more security;
they also tried to solve different cross layer
issues. Perumal et al. [7] talk about forensic
investigation in machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications and the Smart Grid. Hegerty [8]
discusses the fundamental challenges IoT poses
to digital forensics and identifies key areas that
solutions should address.
An interesting paper by Oriwoh et al. [9] covers
the modeling perspective of IoT forensics. The
paper presents an example IoT crime scenario
and attempts to identify sources of evidence
within it. This paper also discusses how IoT
digital forensics differs from classic digital
forensics and emphasizes the requirement for a
“Next Best Thing (NBT) Model of digital
forensics” [9]. Work done in our paper moves
the research closer to the goal. Valera et al. [10]
cover a special application of IoT: medical
devices. They also suggest that their set of
security techniques and cryptographic SIM cards
can make IoT devices with RFID/NFC more
secure. Arias et al. [11] have used Nest
Thermostat and Nike++ Fuelband as example
IoT devices to discuss some common design
practices and their implications for security and
privacy of these devices.
Copos et al. [12] collected network data from an
IoT device, the Nest Thermostat, using dumpcap,
a network traffic sniffing tool. Then, from the
collected data, they tried to infer whether
someone is home. Peisert et al. [13] show how
using a model can result in forensic analysis
requiring a much smaller amount of carefully
selected, highly useful data. In our paper, we
present a new model that summarizes the finding
from IoT devices and helps the investigator
follow a structured process of investigation.



How much are we aware of privacy
issues?
 Can the new type of data and traces
from these devices be utilized for
forensic purposes, and if so, how can
we collect and model them efficiently?
 What kind of data and attack related
information and semantics can be
retrieved from IoT devices?
 What can we learn from looking at IoT
device data trails?
 How useful is the above mentioned data
for forensic purposes?
 What are some possible scenarios where
such data and information can aid
forensic investigations?
 How is collected data interpreted in
those scenarios?
 What new questions arise in addition to
those posed by classic digital forensics?
 Can we develop a new forensic model
to incorporate these questions?
These questions are very important for
individuals, organizations and governments.
Unfortunately, not much work has been done in
the field of IoT mobility forensics. This paper is
a significant step towards filling the gap.

4. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
4.1 IoT Device Selection and Setup
We studied multiple IoT devices [4, 14, 15] and
considered two of them.


3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The “Internet of Things” is not just a dream
anymore. In the form of smart grid, smart homes,
smart devices, smart cars (V2V), and M2M (in
general), IoT is already here. Lack of security in
IoT reflects the lack of security in cyberspace.
This raises several important questions:
 Are those devices secure in the
environment in which they function?



“Sen.se mother” [4] comes with a hub
(called Mother) and 4 sensors (called
Cookies). Cookies can be attached to an
object (for example, a door, keyring,
person or pets). They can be used for
multiple purposes: (1) tracking how
much you have walked or run or how
much coffee you have consumed, (2)
child care (to determine that the child is
in the house), (3) a door alarm, (4) a
medication reminder, and (5) sensing
temperature and sleeping habits. In
addition, devices from other platforms
such as Nest and Philip Hue can be used
with the Sen.se mother hub.
The Hub from Samsung [14] can also
connect additional smart devices (sold
by Samsung) to the Mother. So, its
additional functionality can be extended

by choosing many kinds of devices to
use with it.
As Sen.se Mother offers more flexibility and
more diverse applications, we chose the first
option. Installing Sen.se Mother was not straight
forward. We had to collect the MAC address of
the device using Wireshark to get it connected to
the Internet. Once the Hub was connected, we
deployed 4 sensors to collect different types of
data. Collected data is visually displayed in the
Sen.se Dashboard [4], a web portal provided by
the vendor.

4.3 Sen.se API Documentation
The Sen.se has an application program interface
(API) and associated documentation [16]. This
serves three types of audiences:




4.2 The Cookies and the Hub
As noted in the previous section, the Hub is a
collector entity connected to the Internet. The
primary job of the Hub is to act as a supervisor,
configure the Cookies for specific tasks, collect
data from the Cookies, and send them to the web
portal. Cookies are sensors deployed to collect
application specific data. A Cookie can save up
to ten days of data without connecting to the
Mother. As soon as a Cookie is reconnected to
the Hub, it uploads all contents of its memory. A
Cookie contains a CR2016 replaceable button
cell with one year of battery life. To
communicate with Mother, Cookies use radio
(frequencies are 915 MHz in North America and
868 MHz in Europe). Every type of movement
has its own pattern and signature. By placing a
Cookie on an object or person we can capture
and analyze movements. The Cookie will
recognize a specific action that is to be
monitored and will transmit sensed data for the
chosen application. Some Cookies also contain
thermometers. They can transmit the ambient
temperature as well as sudden abnormal changes
in temperature to the Hub. Another interesting
feature of the Cookie is its ability to signal
presence or absence of a person or object. One
Cookie can be used for only one application
given at a specific time. We deployed 4 sensors
with 4 specific tasks:
 Bedroom door for security notification
 Thermostat for room temperature
monitoring
 Sensing physical exercise and
 Sensing presence at home
When the smart-phone app for Sen.se Mother is
connected to the web portal, it receives real-time
notifications of events [4].



Users who want to access the data
produced by their devices and build
their own programs using those data
and devices
Developers using the Sen.se platform to
create new applications for Sen.se users.
Users can install these applications
(referred to as native apps) in the same
fashion as regular Sen.se applications,
and they will be displayed on the web
portal
Developers willing to use the data
provided by a Sen.se platform to enrich
an external application (such as
Android apps)

The Sen.se API is REST-oriented and returns
data in JSON format. Although this API is a
good way to access the data collected by sensors,
it doesn’t give the user or developer any
opportunity to access actual devices.

4.4 Data Collection
Four Cookies have collected data for the four
applications from May 11, 2016 to May 31, 2016.
First, the bedroom door application that tracks
activities at bedroom door stored and reported all
activities. Some data were false positives and
false negatives. When the sensor sensitivity level
is too low, occasionally it can’t detect very light
activity at the door. On the other hand, if sensor
sensitivity is very high, opening up other doors
may trigger the alarm. But sensitivity is
adjustable and it is easy to figure out the
sensitivity level suitable for a given scenario.
Collected data shown in the web portal contains
information related to time, place and number of
movements detected.
The second sensor was used to collect
temperature data. Whenever the temperature
crosses a user-specified threshold, a notification
is sent to a smart phone application. In our
scenario, the lower limit was set to 59°F and the
upper limit was set to 78°F.
Another sensor was deployed to trace the
presence of a person at home. We observed false

positives and negatives at times. When the
subject was sleeping and sensor did not detect
any movement in the room, it reported that the
subject left home. Also, the subject may have left
the Cookie behind, violating the sensors’
assumption that the subject is in the same place
as the Cookie. Collection of such data can be
very important for scenarios like child care. At
the same time, this kind of data is very sensitive
the from privacy and cyber security point of
view. In the wrong hands, presence- and
absence- related data can be very harmful and
consequential.
The fourth sensor was deployed to monitor the
physical activity of the subject such as walking.
Again, there was a high rate of false negatives,
although very few false positives. For example,
the sensor reported that the subject spent four
days out of seven without walking, which is
absurd; most likely, the subject forgot to carry
the sensor. Or, perhaps an attacker deliberately
manipulated sensor data. Again, this is sensitive
information from both the privacy and security
points of view. The data collected can reveal the
subject’s pattern of life, which may prove useful
to an attacker.
Data collected from sensors gave us insight into
what next steps of our work should be. From the
API documentation, we understood that we can
only access the data stored in the database; we
had no direct access to the devices through the
API. The API queries enabled us to only read the
REST API [17] database. Sen.se already has
apps to access and display that data. Unless our
target is developing a new app, there is not much
motivation to write a new app to collect data
from the forensics point of view. On the other
hand, Oriwoh et al. [9] have shown that by
applying a scenario based approach, we can
determine the forensic significance of the data
collected by apps. Hence, from practical attack
and crime scenarios, we can interpret the data
collected from a crime scene. After analyzing
such scenarios and data, we have created a
general model that formalizes a digital forensics
approach for IoT. This approach also enables us
to answer the research questions we started with.

5. RESULTS
5.1 Data Classification

We classified the data collected from four
applications. In table 1, for each set of
information collected, we identify the source of
the information and whether the information
reveals the subject’s location or daily routine.
We have indicated the severity of the leak too.
The severity is considered high if both location
and daily routine can be derived from the data;
medium if only one of those is fully exposed;
and Low if neither is exposed. Finally, we have
described forensic interpretation of the data.
Table 1. Classification of IoT device data
Information
Door
movementtime

Door
activity
sensor

Source

No

Location

Daily
routine
Yes

Medium

Severity

Door
movementlocation

Door
activity
sensor

Yes

No

Medium

Temperature

Temperat
ure sensor

No

Yes
(partially)

Low

Presence at
home

Presence/
absence
sensor

Yes

Yes

High

Steps taken

Walk
sensor

No

No

Low

Distance
walked

Walk
sensor

No

No

Low

Time spent in
walk

Walk
sensor

No

Yes

Medium

Calories burnt

Walk
sensor

No

Yes

Medium

Forensics
implication
What time
someone
entered/left the
room or tried
to open the
door?
Someone
entering/leavin
g the room or
trying to open
the door
If the
temperature is
not
comfortable,
there may be
something
wrong with the
room
If the subject
was present at
home at the
time of attack,
can he/she
provide vital
information on
the crime?
How long will
the subject be
out of home?
How long will
the subject be
out of home
and how far
will he/she go?
How long will
the subject be
out of home?
Physical
condition/activ
ity trail of
subject

5.2 Scenario Analysis
Attack scenario analysis helps us understand
how the data collected will be useful in practical
scenarios. Here are some examples of such
scenarios.
Event 1: Burglary




Identification: Door sensor data
indicates the time when the owner left
home. Data indicates that there has been
an activity at 11:40 am, even though the
owner was not home at that time. The
burglary happened on the same day.
Interpretation: Does the data suggest
that the burglar knew the owner’s daily
schedule? This would help us
investigate the incident. For example,
would looking into CCTV camera





footage from across the street that was
collected at 11:40 am be useful?
Preservation: Data collected by the
sensor was stored in the cloud at near
real-time.
Analysis and presentation: Data
presented on graphs is easy to
understand and present to a court, so a
graph correlating events with burglaries
would be helpful.

Event 2: Abnormal death of a businessman,
Mr. X








Identification: Medication sensor data
indicates that Mr. X took medicine at an
abnormal time. In addition, the walk
sensor indicates that Mr. X was walking
at the time the medication sensor at
home reported activity. Does this mean
someone has tampered with Mr. X’s
medication while he was out for a walk?
Or is it simply a bug in the sensor app
that shows Mr. X taking his medicine at
an irregular time? Does this lead us to
the reason for his untimely death?
Interpretation: What does the data tell
us? Is it meaningful? Is our
interpretation correct? Can we trust the
data? What about false positives? False
negatives?
Preservation: Data collected by the
sensor was stored in the cloud at near
real-time.
Analysis and presentation: Data
presented on graphs is easy to
understand. Investigators may look into
other related sensors, such as door
activity or motion sensors. Data can be
correlated to the events either manually
or using automated software resources.
Both methods have scope for further
improvement.







This scenario-based analysis leads us a general
model for IoT mobility forensics.

5.3 Mobility Forensics Model
Figure 1 illustrates the model. The questions
presented in this model are almost the same as
classical criminal investigation and digital
forensics. But the semantic and scope of them
changes as the IoT environment is different than
the conventional one.

Figure 1. IoT mobility forensics model



Event 3: A banker’s laptop at home accessed
by intruder


Identification: A transaction was made
using the banker’s user name at 7:14 am
in the morning. The presence/absence
sensor indicates that the banker was not
home at that time. There was no

indication of a break-in. Door sensor
data from the room where the laptop
was indicates that there has been an
activity at the door in 7:12 am (after the
owner left home).
Interpretation: Does the data suggest
that the intruder knew the owner’s daily
walking schedule? As there was no
break-in, does this mean someone from
inside the house came into the room and
accessed the laptop? Could the banker
have faked the scene to steal the money?
Preservation: Data collected by the
sensor was stored in the cloud at near
real-time, with some possibility of false
positives and false negatives.
Analysis and presentation: Data
presented on graphs is easy to
understand and present to a court.



What happened? What is the
description of the incident (cyber-attack,
crime etc.)? Does it directly impact
human life? Is the incident confined to
IoT devices only? Does it affect other
computers and connected smart
electronics devices?
When did it happen? The time of the
event is crucial for crime investigations
and digital forensics. IoT devices are
especially sensitive to time traces.
Many critical systems and life-saving









machines and IoT devices depend on
millisecond of precision in time.
How did it happen? Identifying the
transition steps from the safe state to
compromised state is one of the most
important part of mobility forensics.
Who and/or what did it? Identifying
the person or object responsible for the
event is the fundamental motivation of
mobility
forensics.
Organizations,
investigators and security researchers
want to follow the event trails, both
electronic and non-electronic, to find
the entity responsible for the attack.
Why did it happen? Finding the reason
for the event is just as important as
finding the entity behind it. When IoT
devices are present, an attack scenario
can be more complex than before, but at
the same time data and digital evidence
collected through IoT devices will
contribute
to
unrevealing
the
complexity using forensics.
What data was collected? This is an
important question for IoT mobility
forensics. In an attack scenario, forensic
decisions may be affected by the
amount of data collected by IoT devices.
Moreover, how much of the data
collected is useful and relevant to the
attack is also an important factor.

5.4 Data Manipulation and Counter
Measures
Understanding the data and model from IoT
mobility forensics suggests some other important
questions.





How much can we trust the data
extracted from IoT devices?
How will the attacker changing the data
before or after collection affect the
forensic analysis?
Can we prevent or detect such
manipulations?

investigators are aware of the fact that certain
portions of the collected data are erroneous.
Recently, Altolini et al. [18] proposed an
encryption and authentication mechanism for
low power IoT platforms. Such an
implementation can help prevent data
manipulation by attackers.

6. DISCUSSION
Our findings thus far point to more questions that
need to be addressed. We briefly discuss some of
these questions here, with some answers from
our set-up.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
Corruption and manipulation of digital data has
always been an issue for the security community.
Even if the attacker doesn’t compromise the
integrity of the data, the data collection process
itself may produce incorrect information
intermingled with accurate data. In our
discussion, we have assumed that the collectionrelated errors are known to happen and

Can the attacker “get into” the
sensors? Kasinathan et al. [19] suggests
that attackers can gain access to sensors
under the right conditions.
Can the attacker “get into” the Hub?
The Hub is directly connected to the
Internet and interacts with the web
portal. Work on IoT intrusion detection
[23] suggests such attacks on hubs are
feasible.
What is the communication medium?
In addition to traditional wireless
networks, IoT devices are connected
through cellular networks, radio,
Bluetooth and other low power
communication media. This diversity
makes the communication more
vulnerable than otherwise, and makes
using generic protections against attacks
harder.
Can we knock down the sensors with
a classic flooding attack? Although we
did not try this on our devices,
Kassinathan et al. [19] suggest that DoS
and flooding attacks may disable IoT
devices.
Can data be manipulated deliberately
to obstruct or mislead justice in a
court of law? We have discussed this
issue in the previous section; it needs
more attention from the security
community.
Is it possible to sniff the hub and
sensors? In our experimental set-up, we
were able to derive device identity
(specifically, the MAC address of the
Hub) by observing network packets.
Copos et al. [12] provide an example of
how sniffing can lead to a major
security breach.

6.2 False Positives and False Negatives
Incorrect results have long been an issue in
security research. Researchers have tried to avoid
and mitigate such erroneous results by applying
different methods [20]. Unfortunately, there is no
single reason behind false positives and
negatives. Likewise, there is no standard solution
either. There are many reasons behind false
positive and false negative reports from IoT
devices. As we indicated in our previous
discussion, the main reason for false positives
and negatives is inaccuracy of sensing, and
human error. Sensors are limited to the physical
information they register and the implementation
of the detection algorithm. Many sensor readings
are tunable. That being said, the users of such
data and models should be aware of the existence
of false positives and false negatives. They
should take proper steps to detect and minimize
false results from IoT devices.

6.3 Limitations
Some limitations of our work are:







Data is collected only from smart home
devices
The forensic model proposed here has
not been implemented, deployed, and
tested
We assume implementation of the
model will be scalable for the fast
growing number of devices, which may
not be true
Our findings depend on data collected
from one type of device. Perhaps
different kinds of devices would
produce more consistent results.

7. FUTURE WORK
This paper contains specific findings and results
based on the smart home IoT device Sen.se
Mother, its Hub, and its Cookies. Future work
should include more generic scenarios where
multiple types of IoT devices and their data are
analyzed. Working towards more robust and
mature model for IoT mobility forensics by
providing better data analysis would be an
improvement. In-depth analysis and discussion
of the data collected is left for future work. As a
huge amount of data is collected and stored, the
privacy of users is an important issue. If large
companies like Google and government
organizations such as US Information Awareness
Office (IAO) have access to such data [21], they
may violate users’ privacy and use the data for

profit or special purposes. Hence, privacy is a
serious research problem in IoT security.
Another interesting open problem is the reverse
question: given a digital forensics scenario and a
forensic model, what useful data can IoT devices
collect for us? This can yield significant result,
useful to both security community and
manufactures of IoT devices. In our future work,
we plane to focus on one specific question that
we have discussed here.

8. CONCLUSION
As the field of IoT is booming, we need to
secure these devices and systems. More work on
mobility forensics for IoT can help achieve that
goal. This paper analyzed data collected from
IoT devices and proposes a new forensics model
to make IoT world more secure. The methods
discussed in this paper are useful for both
industry and academia. Criminal investigation
and evidence collection in the realm of Cyber
Security can get valuable ideas from the work
presented here. We also hope that the users shall
be more aware of IoT security and privacy issues
from the discussion of our paper.
Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Intel and
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